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The year began with a pledge by
Interim Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kami-
sese Mara that a new consitution
"acceptable to the majority of the peo-
ple" would be promulgated before his
government's term expired on 5
December. The Constitutional Inquiry
and Advisory Committee, appointed
by cabinet in October 1988, continued
its public hearings on the so-called
draft constitution in the first half of the
year, receiving a total of 209 submis-
sions. This opportunity to comment
publicly on the draft constitution
served as a catalyst for political mobili-
zation at all levels of society.
The strong opposition voiced by the
National Federation Party/Labour
coalition and by many Indian organiza-
tions was expected, since the draft con-
stitution was designed to formally dis-
criminate against the Indo-Fijian
population. But the criticisms of a
much wider cross-section of the public
(including ethnic Fijians) must have
concerned the government. There was
clearly no consensus on the constitu-
tion, even among the traditionally con-
servative Fijian provincial councils,
some of which argued that it did not go
far enough to protect Fijian interests.
Two issues were of particular signif-
icance in undermining Fijian unity, or
perhaps more accurately, exposing the
myth of Fijian unity. The first con-
cerned the proposed "rights and repre-
sentation" of Fijians from western Viti
Levu (Fiji's largest island). Building on
a long history of grievances stemming
from the domination of Fijian politics
by eastern chiefs, western leaders
declared the creation of a fourth (west-
ern) confederacy, the Yasayasa Vakara.
This challenged the chiefly status quo,
which was built on three confederacies.
However, western Fijians were not
united over the issue. A group closely
aligned to the deposed coalition gov-
ernment and its leader, Dr Timoci
Bavadra, was strongly crictical of the
draft constitution's provisions for west-
ern Fiji. Other advocates of the fourth
confederacy supported the interim gov-
ernment and, with few reservations,
the draft constitution.
This issue presented the interim gov-
ernment with a dilemma. If the Council
of Chiefs was called into session to dis-
cuss the confederacy proposal, the con-
stitution could also be discussed. But
this raised the question of whether the
council should be convened as three
confederacies or four. (A restructuring
of the council in 1987 meant that repre-
sentation at council meetings was now
based on confederacies.) The interim
government chose to shelve the issue to
avoid a possible major confrontation
between supporters and opponents of
the fourth confederacy. Since the
Council of Chiefs was to be the final
arbiter of the new constituion, this
decision also served to delay any action
on the draft constitution.
The second divisive issue centered
on the role of Christian religion in the
proposed new political system. The
commitment to the "teachings of the
Lord Jesus Christ" in the preamble of
the draft constitution reflected the
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wishes of Methodist fundamentalists,
who wield influence in the army and in
the Fijian (taukei) nationalist move-
ment. The interim government had
also supported fundamentalist senti-
ment by adopting a Sunday Observ-
ance Decree that banned all public
activity and work on Sunday. Pressures
on the government to relax the decree
had led to some lifting of restrictions in
late 1988, a move bitterly opposed by
some Methodist leaders.
The rift within the Methodist
church, between militant fundamental-
ists and a more moderate faction, deep-
ened in January when General Secre-
tary Manasa Lasaro was dismissed for
organizing roadblocks to protest the
relaxation of the Sunday Observance
Decree. But in February, the militant
faction instigated a "palace coup,"
replacing president Josateki Koroi with
hardliner Isireli Caucau, suspending
the church constitution, and installing
a new governing council. Lasaro was
reinstated as general secretary.
Attempts by the interim government to
heal the rift failed, and Koroi won a
court order supporting his position as
president. Lasaro was convicted of
contempt of court for ignoring the
court order, and in May received a
three-month suspended jail sentence.
Largely to reassure cane farmers,
the government suspended most of the
provisions of the Sunday Observance
Decree on 30 May, although bans on
trading and organized sport remained
in force. The decision fueled the fires of
Methodist fundamentalism, or perhaps
more accurately, the power struggle
within the church. Despite their sus-
pended jail sentences, Lasaro and his
followers began a roadblock campaign
359
in the northern town of Labasa that
was designed to disrupt the transport
of cane on Sundays. Fifty-seven mili-
tants were arrested and jailed for up to
six months in late July.
In early August General Rabuka
authorized the release of all the jailed
militants under Compulsory Supervi-
sion Orders. This dramatic interven-
tion not only signaled Rabuka's defi-
ance of Ratu Mara and government
policy, and his own collaboration with
the Methodist militants, but also chal-
lenged the integrity of the legal process.
The expected showdown with Ratu
Mara was averted as the interim gov-
ernment turned its attention to the
report of the Constitutional Inquiry
and Advisory Committee, which was
presented to the president at the end of
August, and to the visit by French
Prime Minister Michel Rocard in the
same month.
Although the committee's report
was not publicly released until 20 Sep-
tember, its contents were known well
before then. It recommended some
changes to "controversial" provisions
in the draft constitution. These
included removing the army com-
mander from government, diluting the
reference to religion in the preamble,
and checking the power of the execu-
tive on the issue of citizenship. But the
committee reaffirmed the "inevitable
disparity" of Fijian and Indian political
representation and recommended only
marginal changes to the distribution of .
seats in parliament. The communal
electoral system would remain the only
form of voting. In an apparent conces-
sion to the calls for greater "protection"
of Fijian interests and greater powers
for the Fijian chiefs, the report recom-
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mended a second chamber of parlia-
ment, to be called the Senate of Chiefs.
This would comprise nominees of the
Council of Chiefs and have power of
veto over laws affecting Fijian land and
customary rights. In addition, the com-
mittee recommended the creation of a
twelve-member President's Advisory
Council comprising heads of the Con-
federacies, former heads of state, and
other "distinguished citizens."
Predictably, reaction to the report
was mixed. Cautious voices advocated
support on the grounds that it was the
best that could be hoped for. Coalition
leaders, and later a constitutional sum-
mit of Indo-Fijians, rejected the recom-
mendations, as they had rejected the
draft constitution, for entrenching
racial discrimination and denying
equal rights to a majority of the citizens
of Fiji.
Meanwhile, concern that the army
might take matters into its own hands
mounted when a report that had been
presented to the prime minister and
president in May was leaked to the
press in late September. This detailed
analysis of Fiji's problems, by a group
of army officers led by General
Rabuka, recommended that a new
interim government succeed the exist-
ing one; elections be postponed for up
to fifteen years; the army commander
be given more executive authority;
government be restructured based on
the Fijian administration and custom-
ary law; a state religion be imposed;
the trade unions be suspended; land
tenure law be revised to favor land-
lords rather than tenants; and that
foreign policy be reoriented toward
Southeast Asia, the United States, and
France, and away from the British
Commonwealth. In the event, both
Ratu Mara and General Rabuka indi-
cated their support for the report of the
Constitutional Inquiry and Advisory
Committee, but not what they would
do with it.
On 29 September, Ratu Mara ended
many months of speculation by
declaring his intention to stay in office
for up to two more years, at which
time a new constitution would be put
in place and elections held. This sug-
gested that a constitution would not be
promulgated for at least a year. Ratu
Mara's decision to postpone his retire-
ment was contingent on General
Rabuka and the other military officers
in government choosing between poli-
tics and the army. Within a week,
Rabuka stated his intention to resign as
minister for home affairs and return to
the barracks.
The prospect of a continuation of
the political status quo was welcomed
by the business community, which had
clearly been favored by the economic
policies of the interim government.
Wage restrictions remained in place
while the government continued to
withhold recognition of the Fiji Trades
Union Congress and encourage racially
based splinter unions. Privatization of
statutory bodies was promoted and
deregulation of the manufacturing
sector mooted. Tax-free factories
flourished. The economy was expected
to grow by 3.7 percent in 1990.
However, discontent with the pros-
pect of a continuation of Mara's rule
was apparent in other quarters. The
coalition voiced its suspicion that Ratu
Mara had no intention of relinquishing
power, noting his refusal to engage in a
dialogue with them regarding the con-
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stitution and possible power sharing.
Far more troubling was the response of
extremists within the Methodist church
and Fijian nationalist movement.
Opposed to both Ratu Mara and the
Constitutional Inquiry and Advisory
Committee recommendations, these
extremists favored "solutions" similar
to those proposed by the army officers
in May. Their radicalism was demon-
strated on 15 October when a Muslim
mosque and three Hindu temples were
gutted by firebombs in the western city
of Lautoka. These attacks were part of
a nation-wide campaign aimed ostensi-
bly at opposing the relaxation of the
Sunday Observance Decree, but more
generally at undermining the interim
government and perhaps at precipitat-
ing military intervention.
To the Indo-Fijian population, the
Lautoka firebombings were violations
of immeasurable proportion. Commu-
nal unity was forged. Shops, busi-
nesses, and schools closed to demon-
strate mourning and solidarity.
University students stayed away from
classes. Celebrations marking the
Hindu festival of light, Diwali, were
canceled. However, calm was main-
tained and the feared spiral of violence
failed to materialize. Instead the coun-
try was plunged into a different kind of
mourning by the death from cancer of
coalition leader, Dr Timoci Bavadra,
on 3 November.
No single event since the coup has
had such a momentous impact. Dr
Bavadra's funeral at the chiefly village
ofViseisei was witnessed by one of the
largest gatherings in Fiji's history. Up
to sixty thousand people attended or
tried to attend. The event was testa-
ment to the strength of support for Dr
Bavadra as well as the cause with
which he was identified.
The loss of Dr Bavadra's leadership
was regarded as a major challenge and
setback for the coalition. However,
within weeks Adi Kuini Bavadra, Dr
Bavadra's widow and a high chief, was
named the movement's new leader.
This bold and astute move promised to
retain the coalition's multiracial fol-
lowing and the loyalty that Dr Bavadra
had inspired.
If members of the interim govern-
ment felt uncomfortable having to
respect and accommodate the mourn-
ing of the deposed prime minister it
was not evident. Both the president
and the interim prime minister were
overseas at the time. The army was
spared the embarrassing task of giving
a state funeral to the prime minister it
deposed when Dr Bavadra's family and
elders refused the cabinet's reluctant
offer.
The state funeral of the former gov-
ernor general and Vunivalu (para-
mount chief of Fiji), Ratu Sir George
Cakobau, preoccupied the army and
the government as the year drew to a
close. There were few murmurs of sur-
prise when the interim government's
term was extended another month (to 5
January 1990) in deference to the pass-
ing ofthe Vunivalu. Indeed, some
would recognize the move as the famil-
iar political tactic of buying time.
SANDRA TARTE
NEW CALEDONIA
At the beginning of 1989 New Caledo-
nia was more peaceful than it had been
for many months. The Matignon
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Accord, that had brought the pro-inde-
pendence coalition, the Front de Liber-
ation Nationale Kanake et Socialiste
(FLNKS), and the "loyalist" Rassemble-
ment pour la CaLedonie dans La
Republique (RPCR) toward a tentative
agreement, had been signed and
approved in a national referendum;
overt violence was no longer apparent;
new financial benefits were trickling
into the territory; and high world
nickel prices had rejuvenated the min-
ing industry after years of depression.
Both the FLNKS and the RPCR sought to
gain Melanesian support through
greater economic development in rural
areas.
Inside New Caledonia, however, the
stability was uncertain as there was dis-
sidence within the FLNKS, notably from
Yann-Celene Uregei's Front Uni de
Liberation Kanake (FULK), and from
the more radical Parti de Liberation
Kanake (PALIKA). The loyalist side was
also under some pressure from the
right-wing Front National, which had
experienced renewed support in 1988.
Early in the year the FLNKS strongly
criticized the French government's revi-
sion of the electoral rolls, and objected
to the restricted roll being used only for
the 1998 referendum on independence,
and not for intervening elections. Out-
side New Caledonia there was strong
support for the Matignon Accord.
Vanuatu conceded that France had a
role to play in the region. Both
Vanuatu and Australia drew closer to
France, and France increased its aid to
the region, especially to Fiji. Forty-
seven Kanak militants were released
from jail, and New Caledonia entered
a period of convalescence.
In the March municipal elections
there was increased support for the
pro-independence parties and a setback
for RPCR leader Jacques Lafleur in
Dumbea. The turnout was just under
70 percent, rather higher than the 63
percent for the previous year's referen-
dum on the Matignon Accord. The
FLNKS improved on its performance in
the 1983 elections, winning twenty of
the thirty-two municipalities. Although
the largest party in the FLNKS coalition,
Jean-Marie Tjibaou's Union Caledo-
nienne (UC), claimed about 53 percent
of the pro-independence votes, it
appeared to have lost ground to
PALIKA, which emerged as the second
largest party in the FLNKS. The FULK
scored poorly except in the Loyalty
Islands. The RPCR lost its monopoly in
Noumea, with UC gaining a seat and
three right-wing parties gaining seven
seats (PR, 16 March 1989). Dissident
Wallisians and Futunans, who had usu-
ally supported the RPCR, ran their own
candidates and did well in Paita. In the
east-coast towns of Poindimie and
Ponerihouen there were violent dis-
putes between different parties within
the FLNKS over the outcome of the elec-
tions.
The prevailing mood of cautious
optimism was rudely shattered by the
murder of the president and vice-presi-
dent of the FLNKS, Jean-Marie Tjibaou
and Yeiwene Yeiwene, on 4 May 1989
in Ouvea. They had gone to Ouvea for
a custom ceremony to mark the end of
one year's mourning for the victims of
the Ouvea violence. The two were shot
by Djoubelli Wea, a local pro-indepen-
dence leader, previously a member of
FULK and PALIKA, who was unhappy
with the signing of the Matignon
Accord and concerned that indepen-
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dence had effectively been postponed
indefinitely. He was shot and killed by
Tjibaou's bodyguards.
The assassinations struck the politi-
cal movement a grievous blow. In New
Caledonia, as elsewhere in Melanesia,
politics is very much about personali-
ties. The Melanesian leader who abso-
lutely dominated New Caledonia poli-
tics throughout the turbulent 1980s
was Jean-Marie Tjibaou. Even the dep-
uty leader of FLNKS, Yeiwene Yeiwene,
was largely unknown outside New
Caledonia. Tjibaou was also leader of
the UC, the longest established politi-
cal party in New Caledonia, and the
only party with support throughout the
territory. Perhaps two-thirds of all pro-
independence Kanaks are members.
Throughout the five-year existence of
the FLNKS, and even when the stage
seemed set for an independent Kanaky,
there were regional and other divisions
within the coalition. Tjibaou was able
to cope with dissent and division and
forged a united front on most of the
issues that were crucial to achieving the
timetable for independence.
Tjibaou was born in 1934 in the
Tiendanite valley, inland from
Hienghene, where he later became
mayor. He went to a Catholic school at
Canala, studied sociology at the Sor-
bonne, and attended a seminary in
Paita. After a decade he dropped out of
the priesthood, married Marie-Claude
Wetta, and became leader of the Union
Caledonienne in 1977. He was briefly
vice-president of the Territorial Assem-
bly in 1982. Yeiwene was born in 1945
in Mare. He became a member of the
Territorial Assembly in 1977, was the
deputy leader of the UC, one-time
chairman of the Loyalty Islands region,
and chairman of the domestic airline,
Air Caledonie.
Both the UC and the FLNKS faced the
challenge of finding new leaders, and
particularly of uniting the FLNKS for the
long and difficult road to indepen-
dence. It proved to be an arduous task
for a coalition that had for too long
assumed that Tjibaou would always be
there. By the end of 1989 no decision
had been made regarding the FLNKS
leader. The FULK was further margina-
lized when it failed to condemn the
murders. There was dissent on when a
congress should be held, and strong
views that the leadership of the FLNKS
should come from a party other than
the uc. The always hesitant unity of
the FLNKS was severely threatened, as it
had previously been by the Matignon
Accord, the municipal elections, and
the frustration of waging a long and
bitter struggle with so little reward.
Leadership is likely to impose severe
burdens; few of the potential candi-
dates have the stature of Tjibaou, are
known to be as moderate, and appear
to be capable of achieving consistent
unity.
Two weeks after the murders the
executive of the UC chose as its new
leader Fran~oisBurck, the last survivor
of the group that in 1977 had led the
UC to demand independence. The oth-
ers, Tjibaou, Eloi Machoro, and Pierre
Declercq, have all died in tragic cir-
cumstances. Burck was born in
Noumea in 1939, the son of a part-
Melanesian father and a European
mother, thus claiming "Kanak roots
and European branches" (Le Monde,
22 May 1989). Like his close friend Tji-
baou, he was a former Catholic priest,
and he promised to continue the poli-
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cies of Tjibaou and Yeiwene. But by
stressing that he sought "independence
for everyone," he distanced himself
from the "Kanak independence" that
had previously been demanded.
New provincial elections were held
in June. Again nearly 70 percent of the
electorate took part in the poll, which
predictably gave the RPCR an absolute
majority in the South (based on
Noumea), and the FLNKS equally con-
vincing majorities in the North and the
Loyalty Islands. However, most of the
provincial seats were allocated to UC
members, especially in the Loyalty
Islands, thus alienating members of
other parties in the FLNKS, principally
PALIKA. The presidents of the North
and Loyalty Islands, Leopold Joredie
and Richard Kaloi, are both from the
UC. With control of 27 of the 54 seats,
the RPCR just failed to get an absolute
majority in the territorial congress.
The FULK opposed the elections, but a
promised active boycott failed to mate-
rialize. The hard-line Front National,
which had opposed the Matignon
Accord, won three seats in the South;
two other seats were won by the
extreme right wing Caledonie Demain.
Center parties had no impact, although
a new party, Union Oceanienne, repre-
senting Wallis and Futuna Islanders,
won two seats in the South, indicating
support for their view that migrants
had been ignored in the Matignon
Accord.
The annual conference of the Union
des Syndicats des Travailleurs et
Kanaks Exploites (USTKE) decided by
an overwhelming majority to leave the
FLNKS coalition, partly out of disap-
pointment with the Matignon Accord,
but primarily in order to focus on
industrial and employment issues.
Since the Group des Femmes Kanakes
Exploitees en Lutte (GFKEL) is no
longer active, and Liberation Kanake
Socialiste (LKS) remains outside the
coalition, the FLNKS is now composed
of UC, PALIKA, and the relatively small
Union Progressiste Metanesienne
(UPM) and Parti Socialiste de Kanaky
(PSK). The FULK also remains a mem-
ber, despite talk of expulsion because
of its opposition to the Accord.
On the economic front, nickel min-
ing expanded substantially as prices
remained at their highest levels for a
decade, and the New Caledonian Con-
gress introduced new fiscal measures to
encourage the industry. Tourism con-
tinued the revival that began in I988,
but numbers were still well below the
record levels of I984. A large new hotel
opened at Ouemo (Noumea), and
other smaller hotels were completed in
Poe (Bourail), and in the Loyalty
Islands. Under the provisions of the
Matignon Accord there was progress
toward setting up a port city at Nepoui
in the north, and expanding employ-
ment and training in rural areas. One
of the most surprising economic events
was the purchase of the Banque d'!ndo-
suez in both French Polynesia and New
Caledonia by the Australian bank
Westpac. This expanded Westpac's
banking interests in the Pacific substan-
tially, and made it the first foreign
bank in New Caledonia. There were
other facets of economic change. An
increase in overt unemployment, espe-
cially among young urban Melanesians
and Polynesians, was attributed to
"galloping demography and an inade-
quate job market" and resulted in a sig-
nificant increase in juvenile delin-
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quency and urban violence. The 1989
census revealed that the population
had grown to 164,000, with Melane-
sians representing 45 percent of the
total. There was little progress on land
reform, despite repeated promises.
The year drew to a close with the
pardoning of 26 Kanaks jailed after the
murder of four gendarmes in April
1988, the incident that had precipitated
the Ouvea violence. Although opposed
by the right wing, the amnesty indica-
ted the further distancing of New Cale-
donia from the violence of the immedi-
ate past. The year ended as peacefully
as it had begun. But it had added one
more violent chapter to the recent his-
tory of New Caledonia, and witnessed
what apppeared to be the declining for-
tunes of the FLNKS, despite its contin-
ued electoral support.
JOHN CONNELL
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
This was Papua New Guinea's most
difficult year since independence in
1975. On Bougainville Island more than
fifty people died and many more were
injured in clashes between security
forces and militant landowners near
the giant Panguna copper and gold
mine, and in outbursts of ethnic vio-
lence between Bougainvilleans and
migrants from other provinces. The
forced closure of the mine in May 1989
had serious economic consequences,
especially for government revenues and
the country's balance of payments.
More important, however, were the
political and social implications of the
Bougainville crisis. The national gov-
ernment was unable to negotiate or
impose a solution, while the undisci-
plined behavior of its security forces
served to exacerbate existing ethnic
and separatist tensions.
Growing dissatisfaction with
Bougainville Copper Limited's
response to certain long-standing griev-
ances had led some landowners to
adopt militant tactics in late 1988. The
initial campaign of bombing and arson
directed against company property was
orchestrated by a group of landowners,
led by a former mine employee, Francis
Ona, who had become disenchanted
with the leadership and approach of
their representative body, the Panguna
Landowners Association. However,
Ona's group, associated with the so-
called new Panguna Landowners Asso-
ciation, and based in Nasioi villages
close to the mine, was not the only one
active in 1989. Acts of violence were
also committed by individuals and
gIOUpS in broad sympathy with Ona's
anticompany and secessionist senti-
ments, but pursuing their own particu-
lar agendas (May 1989,23-25). Most of
the action, which included the toppling
of power pylons and shooting at traffic
on the Port-Mine Access Road, was
designed to put the mine out of produc-
tion.
While some landowners, notably
the officers of the trust fund set up in
1980 to invest compensation payments
on behalf of landowners, the Road
Mining Tailings Leases Trust (RMTL),
were prepared to negotiate a settle-
ment, Ona's group was still sticking to
its original demands at the end of the
year. These included 50 percent of the
total revenues generated by the mine
since production commenced in 1972,
and KIO billion to compensate for envi-
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ronmental and social disruption. A call
for a referendum on secession for
Bougainville was added early in 1989.
Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliu
continued throughout the year to press
for a negotiated settlement. The culmi-
nation of these efforts was the so-called
peace package, first announced in late
April, that included provisions for the
transfer of half of the government's 20
percent share of equity in the mining
company to the provincial government
and landowners; a greater share of
mining royalties to go directly to the
landowners; an unconditional annual
grant to the provincial government
equivalent to I percent of the gross
value of minerals produced in the prov-
ince; and a five-year program of sup-
port for development projects in the
prOVince.
The North Solomons Provincial
Government was prepared to accept
the offer, despite the recommendations
of a provincial select committee that all
national government powers, except
foreign affairs, defence, and some cen-
tral banking functions, should be
devolved to the province. Some land-
owner representatives were also pre-
pared to sign the agreement, although
one group, led by the secretary of the
RTML, Lawrence Daveona, floated a
"counter-proposal" that sought tax
concessions for RTML and the free
transfer of all of the government's
equity in the mine to the landowners.
Despite numerous approaches by gov-
ernment representatives and intermedi-
aries, offers of safe-conduct, and cease-
fires, Ona's group continued to reject
the package out of hand, making nego-
tiations conditional on the withdrawal
of all security forces from the province.
During the first half of the year,
Namaliu managed to stand firm
against regular calls from within and
without his government for a "military
solution." In March, members of the
Papua New Guinea Defence Force
were sent in, but to assist police to con-
trol extensive rioting sparked by
clashes between Bougainvilleans and
migrants. There was no determined
offensive against the militants until
June, when the government ordered
security forces to "flush out" Ona and
his men, and activated constitutional
provisions for a state of emergency. In
July, the government announced plans
to introduce an internment bill (later
withdrawn after protests from students
and others), and the first of the four
Australian-donated Iroquois helicop-
ters arrived to provide logistical sup-
port for the security forces.'
Support for a "military solution"
increased significantly after the chair of
the provincial select committee on the
crisis, John Bika, was murdered by
masked gunmen on 12 September. Two
days later Minister of State and former
Defence Commander Ted Diro author-
ized the security forces to use mines
and booby traps to counter further sab-
otage attempts. By the end of the year,
two soldiers had apparently fallen vic-
tim to these devices. In October, Colo-
nel Leo Niua, widely regarded as a
hardliner, replaced Colonel Lima
Dotaona as deputy controller of the
state of emergency (Standish 1989, 10).
At year's end Ona and his key sup-
porters were still at large. The financial
cost of the crisis was already enor-
mous, and no solution was in sight.
The state of emergency itself was esti-
mated to have cost more than twelve
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million kina. At the end of December,
Bougainville Copper Limited finally
announced plans to layoff most of its
employees and to place the mine on a
"care and maintenance" basis. With the
mine out of production, Papua New
Guinea was deprived of 19 percent of
its government revenue, 30 percent of
its exports by value, and some K200
million per year in foreign exchange
earnings.
Other costs were harder to quantify,
but equally important. Nearly four
thousand villagers had been evacuated
from troubled areas and were living in
19 "care centers" in and around Arawa.
Many non-Bougainvilleans had left the
province. There was a growing sense of
outrage among Bougainvilleans at the
conduct of the security forces, espe-
cially the police. Some sixteen hundred
dwellings had been destroyed in raids
on villages suspected of harboring mili-
tants. Provincial premier Joseph Kabui
and one of his ministers, Michael
Laimo, had been beaten by riot police
in July, with Laimo losing an eye as a
result. In April 1989, the widely
respected human rights group,
Amnesty International, began docu-
menting cases of ill-treatment, torture,
and unlawful killing at the hands of the
security forces. By December they had
launched a letter-writing campaign cit-
ing three particular cases of abuse, and
aimed at the prime minister and his
minister for justice (TPNG, 14 Dec
1989).
There were other examples of ill dis-
cipline in the ranks of the police and
the army during 1989. On 8 February
soldiers marched on parliament,
smashing windows and damaging
property along the way, to protest the
size of their long-awaited pay increase.
As a result of this incident, Defence
Force Commander Rochus Lokinap
and the department secretary, Steven
Mokis, were suspended but subse-
quently reinstated at the recommenda-
tion of a Defence Force Board of
Inquiry (PR, 12 Oct 1989). In March,
police demonstrated at the house of
Provincial Affairs Minister John
Momis after he called for the dismissal
of the police commander in Bougain-
ville, Paul Tohian. Then in June, police
shot dead a student on the campus of
the University of Technology in Lae
and were accused of committing crimi-
nal acts on the Waigani campus of the
University of Papua New Guinea by
Vice-Chancellor John Lynch.
Security forces were called on to
deal with riots in Port Moresby, Lae,
Hagen, and Wabag during 1989. Two
people died in Port Moresby in March
as a "peace march" to protest the kill-
ing of a youth leader and his wife, sup-
posedly by migrants from another
area, turned violent. In July, riots
broke out in Hagen and Wabag after
the shooting death of Communication
Minister Malipu Balakau, allegedly at
the hands of supporters of rival High-
lands politician, Paul Torato. Early in
September, a curfew was imposed in
Lae after two days of violence followed
the shooting of a policeman and one of
his relatives. The Morobe Provincial
Government, already under scrutiny
for gross mismanagement of public
funds, was suspended at the same time.
The Lae curfew remained in effect at
the end of 1989.
Prime Minister Namaliu managed
to stave off several attempts to unseat
his government during the year. Unde-
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terred by an unprecedented public out-
cry at the prospect of an early change
of government, the opposition gave
notice of a vote of no confidence in
March, naming Paias Wingti as the
alternate prime minister. The move
gained momentum with the defection
of five members of the government,
including Pangu Pati stalwart Tony Ila,
but was preempted when the govern-
ment adjourned parliament before a
vote could be taken. In the July session
of parliament, the threatened vote
failed to materialize when opposition
estimates indicated that they did not
have the necessary support. Yet an-
other attempt to replace Namaliu in
November ended in a resounding vic-
tory for the government when, after
much wheeling and dealing, the oppo-
sition withdrew its motion of no confi-
dence at the last minute.
A major disappointment of 1989
was the lack of progress on constitu-
tional reforms designed to reduce the
frequency of votes of no confidence.
But the Namaliu government did man-
age to amend parliament's standing
orders in November to require a vote
of no confidence to go through a com-
mittee stage, and to prevent its reintro-
duction in the same session in which it
was withdrawn or defeated.
The Commission of Inquiry into the
Forest Industry, under the leadership of
Judge Tos Barnett, presented its final
report to the prime minister in July.
The lengthy report documents wide-
spread corruption and mismanagement
in Papua New Guinea's lucrative forest
industry. Included in the long list of
prominent leaders implicated by the
inquiry are former Prime Minister and
current Foreign Minister Michael
Somare, and Minister of State Ted
Diro. In the first of many anticipated
disciplinary actions arising from the
work of the commission, the Leader-
ship Tribunal recommended in Octo-
ber the dismissal of Housing Minister
Gerard Sigulogo from parliament for
corruptly requesting K30,000 from a
Malaysian logging contractor (PR, 12
Oct 1989).
Despite the on-going Bougainville
crisis, and depressed prices for Papua
New Guinea's major agricultural
exports, the government promoted a
very optimistic view of the state of the
economy during 1989. Indeed, the 1990
budget provided for a 5 percent
increase in public spending, increased
the National Development Fund (the
"slush fund" for individual members of
parliament) by K6.5 million, and set
aside half a million kina to purchase a
new executive aircraft. This increased
expenditure was to be financed by
drawing heavily on the minerals stabili-
zation fund, and by a substantial
increase in tax revenues and internal
borrowings. However, the continued
closure of the Bougainville mine makes
a major revision of the 1990 budget,
and some large cuts in public expendi-
ture, inevitable.
There were some significant devel-
opments in the mining sector outside
Bougainville during the year. The
agreement to develop the giant Porgera
gold mine was signed in May, with
production expected to commence in
1992. However, this was only after the
minister for the environment had been
forced to withdraw his demand that
the company build a tailings dam, and
the Enga provincial premier had modi-
fied some of his demands for local par-
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ticipation in the venture. The Misima
gold mine commenced production in
June, some three months ahead of
schedule, and construction of the very
rich Lihir mine was expected to begin
in 1990. Meanwhile, the Ok Tedi cop-
per and gold mine continued to be
plagued by mechanical and other prob-
lems. The government's decision not to
require the company to build a perma-
nent tailings dam was a major blow to
environmentalists and villagers con-
cerned about the apparent pollution of
the Ok Tedi and Fly rivers.
In foreign affairs, the government
opened a new consulate in the Indone-
sian province of Irian Jaya in Septem-
ber, and announced plans to appoint
honorary consuls in Guam, Hawai'i,
San Francisco, Hong Kong, and north-
ern Australia. The Soviet Union agreed
to establish an embassy in Port
Moresby, but no opening date had
been announced by the end of the year.
Meanwhile, the Peoples Republic of
China made known its displeasure at
the apparent strengthening of relations
between Papua New Guinea and
Taiwan.
Papua New Guinea suffered a major
loss with the death on the last day of
the year of Sir Ignatius Kilage, elected
as the country's fourth governor-gen-
eral in March 1989. A Highlander and
former Roman Catholic priest, Sir
Ignatius was best known for his ten-
year fight against corruption in govern-
ment as ombudsman. In April 1989, he
had made his presence felt by placing a
full-page advertisement in the newspa-
pers appealing for the peaceful resolu-
tion of the country's many conflicts
and urging "breathing space" for the
beleaguered Namaliu government (PR,
13 April 1989). It seems unlikely that
his wishes will be realized in 1990.
TERENCE WESLEY-SMITH
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SOLOMON ISLANDS
Prime Minister Ezekiel Alebua's 1988
speech marking the tenth anniversary
of independence raised a number of
alarming issues that remained relevant
in 1989. Alebua noted that population
was increasing at a rate of 3.5 percent
per annum, while the rate of economic
growth was a mere 1.5 percent. The
rate of inflation was estimated to be 20
percent in 1988, and may have been as
high as 26 percent in 1989. The three-
volume I987 Constitutional Review
Committee Report, published in 1988,
alleged that the government was out of
touch with the people and advocated
further decentralization.
The teachers went on strike for a
pay increase just weeks prior to the
February 1989 general election. Ini-
tially said to be illegal (STT, 17 Feb
1989, I), the strike caused concern
nationwide and became an important
element in the elections. By February,
schools were closed down, teachers
had been sacked, and the Alebua care-
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taker government was requiring them
to reapply if they wanted their jobs
back. People's Alliance Party (PAP)
leader Solomon Mamaloni blamed the
Alebua government for the strike and
promised to do something for the
teachers if elected to government (SS,
10 Feb 1989, 3). This may have boosted
support for PAP at the polls.
More than two hundred fifty candi-
dates, representing six political parties,
contested the general election held on
22 February. The result was a major
victory for Solomon Mamaloni and the
PAP, and a major defeat for the United
Party after four years in government.
PAP improved considerably on its 1984
total of six seats. It claimed the support
of eleven successful official party can-
didates, and several more who had run
as independents. On the other hand,
only three of the eight United Party
candidates were successful, and eight
former ministers in the Alebua govern-
ment lost their seats (PR, 2 March
1989). Member for West 'Are'are,
Andrew Nori's Nationalist Front for
Progress won four seats, as did the new
Liberal Party led by Bart Ulufa'alu, MP
for East Honiara. A Labour Party
founded by Joses Tuhanuku, for years
general secretary of the Solomon
Islands National Union of Workers,
won two seats, including his own of
Rennell and Bellona.
On 28 March Solomon Mamaloni
was elected prime minister by parlia-
ment, easily defeating Bart Ulufa'alu
by 25 votes to 10 (PR, 30 March 1989).
Shortly before his election, Mamaloni,
who had been prime minister from
1981 to 1984, stated that he had been
"struggling for twelve years to have the
numbers for a one-party government."
Although the fourteen members of the
cabinet that he announced early in
May were all members of PAP, not all
had been official PAP candidates in the
election. For example, the former gov-
ernor-general, Sir Baddeley Devesi,
who became minister for foreign
affairs, had run as an independent; the
new deputy prime minister, Danny Phi-
lip, had run as a member of the Liberal
Party, and the new minister for trans-
port, works, and utilities, Michael
Maena, had stood for the Nationalist
Front for Progress. Nevertheless,
Mamaloni could claim with some accu-
racy that "the policies and plans of the
Alliance Party can now be carried out
effectively" (SS, 10 March 1989, 2).
Attorney General Frank Kabui was
PAP's choice for speaker of parliament,
but his nomination was opposed by the
ambassador to the United Nations and
the United States and former secretary
to cabinet, Francis Saemala, on the
grounds that he had not resigned from
the public service as required by the
constitution. As a result, Waeta Ben,
MP for Northeast Guadalcanal, was
formally elected to the post (SS, 17
March 1989, I). The by-election result-
ing from Kabui's departure was won by
PAP candidate and senior official in the
labour department, Hilda Kari. She
became the first woman elected to par-
liament, and only the second involved
in national politics since the late Lily
Ogatina Poznanski was appointed to
the Legislative Council in the 1960s.
Between March and April 1989, the
Mamaloni government began to
emphasize the weaknesses of the out-
going government. According to
Mamaloni, "the whole government
establishment is untidy, disgraceful,
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and has lost the sense of proper direc-
tion" (SS, 14 April 1989, I). Since inde-
pendence, he claimed, certain govern-
ment ministries had grown too fat and
complex, while others were too thin;
officials at all levels were no longer
sure where their priorities should be;
and the uncontrolled influx of foreign
expertise and sophisticated equipment
into the public service had promoted
chaos rather than stability. To increase
government efficiency, he announced
the formation of a new ministry of
housing and government services, to be
headed by the MP for North Choiseul,
Allan Qurusu, and staffed by officers
of "the highest calibre" (SS, 14 April
1989,1).
The new government inherited a
chaotic financial situation, including a
massive foreign debt of SI$280 million;
a Solomon Islands dollar that had
declined in value by 25 percent; very
high interest rates; a budget deficit of
SI$70 million; a demoralized business
sector; and some SI$5 million in uncol-
lected taxes.
To monitor government spending, a
three-man committee was appointed,
headed by a member of the Freema-
sons, Patrick O'Callaghan, with John
Loli and Robertson Galo (SS, 5 May
1989, I; 12 May 1989, 2). They soon
discovered that the government was
spending SI$25,000 a day.
To reduce the numbers of foreigners
employed in the civil service, the prime
minister stated that Freemasons should
have their employment terminated
(despite the fact that one of their mem-
bers chaired the committee on govern-
ment spending), and bilateral aid
should be temporarily halted (SS, 14
April 1989, 6). This caused some con-
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cern even among politicians, but was
justified in terms of a general policy of
trimming national spending and reduc-
ing dependence on foreign expertise
(SS, 5 May 1989, I).
To increase government revenues,
government agencies were encouraged
to collect monies already owed, and to
identify other sources of income.
Uncollected revenues for the period
1985-1987 were estimated to be
SI$36.14 million, while overspending
by some ministries for the same period
amounted to some SI$80.48 million.
An act to impose surcharges on public
officers came into force in the third
week of August. Minister for Finance
Christopher Abe stated that the act
would "enable the Government to
penalize public officers who fail to
carry out their duties, are guilty of neg-
ligence, damage government proper-
ties, ... are responsible for financial
losses, fail to obey orders, or misuse
government property" (SS, 18 Aug
1989, I).
The new Ministry of Housing and
Government Services started investi-
gating more than six hundred compa-
nies to ensure that their taxes were in
order (SS, 2 July 1989, I). A total of
SI$2,670,000 in missing funds was
written off by means of Appropriation
Bill (No.3), which went through par-
liament in "less than seven minutes"
(SS, II Aug 1989, 2). The government
also announced plans to sell Solrice,
the National Fisheries Development
Corporation, and the Mendafia Hotel,
to private enterprises. Kitano Com-
pany of Japan later bought an 80 per-
cent share of the Mendafia Hotel,
which was worth SI$6.5 million (SS, I?
Nov 1989, 2).
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A joint venture between the govern-
ment and the Commonwealth Devel-
opment Corporation (CDC) to set up a
timber plantation and processing com-
pany at Kolombangara, Western Prov-
ince, was signed on 10 January 1989.
However, incoming Prime Minister
Mamaloni raised some questions about
the extent of local participation in the
venture later in the year (SS, 5 May
1989,3). A project aimed at improving
smallholder farming was also initiated
early in the year with a $7.5 million
grant from the EEC's STABEX fund.
Meanwhile, a casino project in
Guadalcanal was delayed because of
land disputes between the Kindapala
and Kakau tribes, who both claim
ownership of Poha, west of Honiara
(SS, 27 Jan 1989, I).
In the area of foreign affairs, Solo-
mon Islands signed a border agreement
with Papua New Guinea in February,
and established diplomatic relations
with Israel early in September. The
border agreement, which allows people
with relatives in areas near the border
to cross freely, was temporarily sus-
pended when an official in Bougainville
decided that arms could easily be
smuggled to militants in Bougainville
from the Shortland and Treasury
islands. When the decision was chal-
lenged by the deputy prime minister,
officials in Port Moresby claimed that
they had to authorize the change on a
temporary basis (SS, 3 Nov 1989, I).
Solomon Islands strongly supported
the movement spearheaded by the
Forum Fisheries Agency to ban driftnet
fishing in the region, which culminated
in the November Wellington Conven-
tion. Meanwhile, the Taiyo Fishing
Company transferred its canning oper-
ations from the Tulagi area to Noro
port, Western Province, where a new
wharf had recently been built. The sup-
ply of tinned fish was reduced from
March until July, when the Noro can-
nery went into full production.
Some disparaging comments aimed
at Malaitans and allegedly written by
an individual from Rennell or Bellona
sparked off an "ethnic riot" in Honiara
in early November. The prime minister
agreed to pay the Malaita people
SI$200,000 in compensation to quell
the violence. This sum, said to be
excessive by the member for North
Malaita, Francis Saemala, did not
reflect the real wishes of the people of
that island, since the violence was
probably politically motivated.
The new government indicated that
Solomon Islands "may" have free edu-
cation up to Form 5 in ten years. The
selection system from Standard 6 and
Form 3 will be abolished, and another
three high schools built by 1993 (SS, 15
Sep 1989, 15). In December, however,
the country found out that only 30 per-
cent of Standard 6 children will be able
to attend either national or provincial
high schools. The rest will become
"dropouts."
Much of what developed after PAP
took over government was forecast by
their Programme ofAction 1989-1993,
launched in July 1989. Most noticeable
were the government's attempts to
revive the economy. But by the end of
the year inflation was still rising, and
salary increases in the public service
helped to pump up the prices of
imports. While the prime minister
blamed the situation on lack of "politi-
cal will" (SS, 15 Dec 1989, I), the minis-
ter for finance expressed caution about
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the prospects for 1990. The govern-
ment's success or otherwise in salvag-
ing the economy will be the top story of
1990 (STY, 168, I).
ESAU TUZA
Additional information for this review
was supplied by Peter Larmour and
Murray Chapman.
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VANUATU
The year began with the ousting of
President Sokomanu from office fol-
lowing a parliamentary vote accusing
him of gross misconduct. He was tried
and jailed along with the five members
of the opposition who took part in his
interim government. The six men
appealed the decision before the
supreme court and were acquitted in
April 1989.
Various elections were held during
the year. The opposition, a coalition of
the Union des Partis Moderes and the
Melanesian Progressive Party, won the
Port Vila municipal contest in Febru-
ary. The position of mayor, currently
occupied by Alick Noel, will remain
under their control for the next four
years. In the regional elections of
August 1989, victory was shared about
equally between the governing
Vanua'aku Pari and the opposition,
with the latter showing substantial
progress since 1985. The low voter
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turnout (averaging 60 percent) and the
ambiguity of the results made the out-
come of the 1991 legislative elections
difficult to predict.
Throughout the year, Prime Minis-
ter Walter Lini and the Vanua'aku Pati
attempted to consolidate their hold on
the republic. President Sokomanu was
replaced by Fred Timakata, a high
chief and member of parliament for
Emae Island in the Shepherds group.
Timakata, an ex-Presbyterian church
minister and ex-minister for health,
was the official Vanua'aku Pati candi-
date and won the election by 41 votes
to 1. In contrast to Sokomanu, Tima-
kata repeatedly emphasized the nonpo-
litical and ceremonial nature of the
presidency and pledged to promote the
unity of the nation.
Walter Lini and the Vanua'aku Pati
might appear to have emerged stronger
than ever from the political events of
1989. However, the young republic is
undergoing a deep underlying social
transformation which may modify its
political makeup profoundly. The
long-standing and pernicious rivalry
between the so-called francophone and
anglophone factions, which has
resulted in violent confrontation at
times, is on its way out. Events in 1989
served to dispel this legacy of the
Anglo-French condominium govern-
ment, making it appear more and more
artificial. During the crisis of 1988-
1989, Walter Lini gained the support of
various francophones, particularly cer-
tain young intellectuals home from
their studies in France. Conversely, the
traditional opposition, the Union des
Partis Moderes led by Maxime Carlot,
has been reinforced by the creation of
Barak Sope's Melanesian Progressive
i$P44RJ!Q"MPMM.
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Party. New alliances are replacing old
ones and are increasingly determined
by local political issues rather than by
external issues, such as relations with
the ex-colonial powers. Vanuatu
appears to be slowly shedding its inher-
ited neocolonial personality and begin-
ning to define its own political identity.
In this vein, differences over rela-
tions with France, including the New
Caledonian issue, have ceased to be the
main divisive factor in ni-Vanuatu poli-
tics. The neutrality observed by French
officials during the recent crisis, and
the improvement of the political situa-
tion in New Caledonia, have undoubt-
edly prompted this development. Rela-
tions with France are becoming a more
rational foreign policy issue, rather
than a focus of passionate internal divi-
sion. This is the case despite a major
crisis that erupted between the two
countries immediately after Jean-Marie
Tjibaou's assassination in May 1989.
Radio Vanuatu, which misinterpreted
~ Radio Australia report of the event,
accused France of instigating the
Kanak leader's murder. This state-
ment, echoed by Hilda Lini, the prime
minister's sister, was not reversed until
much later.
Minister for Foreign Affairs Donald
Kalpokas and Marie Lini, Walter Lini's
wife, met with French Prime Minister
Michel Rocard while attending Jean-
Marie Tjibaou's funeral in Noumea.
The ensuing frank dialogue prevented
a complete break in relations between
the two countries. Following the ni-
Vanuatu delegation's return to Port
Vila, Radio Vanuatu issued a state-
ment concerning the true circum-
stances of the assassination. Walter
Lini's government later officially
backed the Matignon Accord and
called for normalization of relations
between the two countries. In ex-
change, France agreed to send a charge
d'affaires to Port Vila. Donald Kalpo-
kas and Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Nike Nike Vurobaravu's official visit
to Paris in November 1989, at Michel
Rocard's invitation, signaled the onset
of more relaxed relations.
The happy resolution of this major
diplomatic incident helped alleviate
political instability within Vanuatu.
But the young island state continues to
be plagued by political problems. It
suffers from a chronic economic crisis
associated with the downturn in world
prices for copra and the steady increase
of unemployment in Port Vila. The
resource-rich island of Espiritu Santo
has not recovered from its rebellion of
a decade ago and has been unable to
recapture its role as a spearhead for
economic development in the northern
islands. Walter Lini has had to make
some concessions in attempting to rem-
edy this situation. In February 1989, he
met for the first time with representa-
tives of the local private sector, who
have been urging such consultations
since independence.
The 1989 budget was austere, with
stringent cuts affecting education and
health. However, the Vanuatu police
force, whose loyalty to Walter Lini
helped uphold his government in 1988,
although it subsequently threatened to
go on strike, received an increase of
approximately 20 percent over their
1988 allocation. Various ministries
were reshuffled in March 1989, with
the total number reduced from eleven
to ten.
Not all aspects of the economy were
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entirely negative during 1989. An Air
Vanuatu service was launched with the
purchase of a Boeing 727 from Austra-
lian Airlines for A$9.7 million, funded
in part by an Australian grant of A$6
million. An A$I.5 million campaign to
promote tourism filled previously
empty hotel rooms. However, tour-
ism's ability to help solve the economic
crisis remained to be seen.
Seeking to reduce tensions with
neighbors as well as internationally,
the Lini government has adopted an
increasingly pragmatic foreign policy.
This trend was confirmed at the
Vanua'aku Pati congress in June 1989,
where the need for a policy of "con-
structive engagement" was stressed.
Relations with Australia and New
Zealand have recently been marked by
goodwill on all sides, reflecting the Lini
government's new emphasis on eco-
nomic issues.
In spite of these efforts, the eco-
nomic crisis remains severe. While the
business circle of Port Vila has hardly
suffered, a large proportion of the pop-
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ulation has fallen back on a traditional
island lifestyle of self-sufficiency based
on the consumption of root crops, an
alternative rejected by many young
people. This has aggravated the gulf
between the "bush" (the outer islands)
and Port Vila, a situation which the
opposition has sought to take advan-
tage of while actively campaigning in
the outer islands. Other, older, cultural
and geographic tensions existing
between various islands, as well as
between the north and the south of the
archipelago, have re-emerged, further
sharpening latent centrifugal tenden-
CIes.
Although the events of 1988-1989
resulted in a major defeat for the
Carlot-Sope opposition, it has not lost
its zeal. The leaders expect to win the
1991 parliamentary elections, provided
their parties remain unified. This time
they have chosen a legal means of
acceding to power.
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